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Recent Cases
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
03-1426,-1489
VASTFAME
CAMERA, LTD.,
Appellant,
and
ARGUS INDUSTRIES,
INC.,
Appellant,
v.
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION,
Appellee,
and
FUJI PHOTO
FILM CO., LTD.,
Intervenor.
Joseph
W. Bain, Akerman Senterfitt, of West
Palm Beach, Florida, argued
for VastFame Camera, Ltd.
Jean
H. Jackson, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. International
Trade Commission, of Washington, DC, argued
for appellee. With her on the
brief were Lyn M. Schlitt, General Counsel, and James M. Lyons,
Deputy General Counsel.
Lawrence
Rosenthal, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, of New York, New York, argued
for intervenor. With him on the
brief were Matthew W. Siegal, Lisa A. Jakob, Angie M.
Hankins and Howard D. Shatz. Of counsel were Will E. Leonard
and Michael L. Doane, Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg, L.L.P., of
Washington, DC.
Appealed from: United
States International Trade
Commission
United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
03-1426, -1489
VASTFAME CAMERA, LTD.,
Appellant,
and
ARGUS INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION,
Appellee,
and
FUJI PHOTO FILM CO., LTD.,
Intervenor.
_____________________________
DECIDED:
October 7, 2004
_____________________________
Before CLEVENGER, BRYSON,
and LINN, Circuit Judges.
LINN, Circuit Judge.
This
appeal is one of two related appeals from a decision of the International
Trade Commission (“Commission”) involving
“single-use” or “disposable” 35 mm film cameras,
more formally known as “lens-fitted film packages”
(“LFFP”). VastFame
Camera, Ltd. (“VastFame”) appeals from the Commission’s
determination that importation of VastFame’s LFFPs violates a
pre-existing general exclusion order.
In re Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. No. 337-TA-406
(Int’l Trade Comm’n May 2, 2002) (“Initial Determination”). Because the Commission’s
decision refusing to allow VastFame to present its invalidity defense was
contrary to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c), we vacate the Commission’s
infringement determination with respect to VastFame and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
This
proceeding arises out of the Commission’s investigation, entitled In
re Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, which resulted in the issuance of
a general exclusion order on June 9, 1999.
Inv. No. 337-TA-406 (Int’l Trade Comm’n June 9, 1999)
(“Initial Investigation”).
The Initial Investigation involved newly made and refurbished
LFFPs. The Initial Investigation also involved numerous Fuji Photo Film Co.,
Ltd. (“Fuji”) patents,
including U.S. Patent No. 4,884,087
(“the ’087 patent”).
At least one party in the Initial Investigation raised an invalidity
defense with respect to the ’087 patent, but the defense was
abandoned before any judgment on the merits.
VastFame
was not a party to the Initial Investigation, and its VN99 and VN991
cameras were not at issue in that investigation. Although VastFame was not a named
respondent in the Initial Investigation, it knew that the proceedings were
taking place. VastFame was
notified of the proceedings in a March 25, 1998 letter from Fuji. The
letter informed VastFame that it had been identified as a potential
respondent, offered to supply VastFame with a copy of the supplemented
complaint, and advised VastFame that whether or not it joined, it would be
bound by the decision. VastFame
refused to join the proceedings.
After
the general exclusion order issued, VastFame obtained a ruling from the
U.S. Customs Service
(“Customs”) that the VN99 and VN991 cameras did not violate the
general exclusion order. Lens-Fitted
Film Packages, Pub. No. 468780, ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-406 (Customs Serv. Mar. 27,
2000). Customs only considered one of the
fifteen patents upon which the general exclusion order was based. Nevertheless, having concluded that
VastFame’s LFFPs did not violate the general exclusion order, Customs
allowed the importation of VastFame’s VN99 and VN991 cameras
beginning in early 2000.
In June
2001, Fuji filed a complaint with the Commission requesting
enforcement and advisory proceedings to determine whether VastFame and
others had violated the general exclusion order. In those proceedings, VastFame pled
as a defense that claim 15 of the ’087 patent was invalid under 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103(a) in view of certain prior art
references. Vastfame fully
briefed the invalidity defense and was prepared to put on its case at the
trial, but the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) refused to
consider invalidity, ruling that the defense could not be raised in the
enforcement proceeding. Initial
Determination, slip op. at 64 n.33. The ALJ explained his position at a
pretrial conference. At that
conference, he advised the parties that the Commission’s order
directing the ALJ to conduct the proceedings did not permit him to
entertain a validity challenge to the patents underlying the general
exclusion order. The ALJ
expressed the view that the Commission’s order limited him to
determining only whether the importation of the enforcement
respondents’ cameras violated the general exclusion order.
In
February 2002, the ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issues
raised in Fuji’s complaint. On May 2, 2002, the ALJ concluded
that the VN99 and VN991 cameras infringed only one claim asserted by Fuji,
namely, claim 15 of the ’087 patent. Initial Determination. Based on the finding of
infringement, the ALJ held that the VN99 and VN991 cameras were in
violation of the general exclusion order and could no longer be
imported. Because Fuji’s complaint
sought both enforcement and advisory proceedings, the ALJ simultaneously
issued separate opinions in the form of an initial determination on
enforcement and an advisory opinion regarding violation of the general
exclusion order. See In
re Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. No. 337-TA-406 (Int’l Trade Comm’n May
2, 2002) (advisory opinion).
Upon
entry of the ALJ’s enforcement initial determination, VastFame
petitioned the Commission to remand the case to the ALJ for consideration
of the previously excluded invalidity defense. The Commission declined to review
the ALJ’s decision on this issue leaving the decision as the final
determination of the Commission.
In re Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. No. 337-TA-406
(Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 7, 2002). On
May 15, 2003, the
Commission finalized its proceedings.
In re Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. No. 337-TA-406
(Int’l Trade Comm’n May 15, 2003).
VastFame
timely appealed to this court.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6).
DISCUSSION
A. Standard
of Review
As
the agency charged with the administration of § 1337, the
Commission is entitled to appropriate deference to its interpretation of
the statute. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Enercon GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Under Chevron, we must first look to “whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 467 U.S. at 842. As the Supreme Court explained,
“If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Id. at 843 n.9. However, “if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”
Id. at 843. In
the latter case, this court will “uphold the [Commission’s] interpretation of [19 U.S.C.
§ 1337] if it is reasonable in light of the language, policies
and legislative history of the statute.” Enercon, 151 F.3d at 1381; see
also San Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 161 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Enercon,
151 F.3d at 1381).
B. Statutory
Basis of the Enforcement Proceeding
As a
threshold matter, the parties disagree as to the statutory basis of the
enforcement proceeding before the Commission. This is an issue we must decide
before we can determine if the Commission erred in not providing VastFame
an opportunity to present its invalidity defense. VastFame argues that the enforcement
proceeding, which was expressly conducted under 19 C.F.R.
§ 210.75(b), constituted an investigation under
§ 1337(b) because that is the only provision that authorizes the
type of inquiry engaged in by the Commission in this case. The Commission argues that
§ 1337 provides the Commission with general authority to enforce
its own exclusion orders. It
argues that multiple provisions in § 1337 indicate that Congress
intended for the Commission to have a role in enforcing its own
orders.
Neither
party cites express statutory authority for enforcement proceedings, and we
have found none. Because the
statute is silent with respect to the Commission’s authority specifically
to conduct enforcement proceedings, the Commission’s interpretation
of § 1337 may be entitled to deference “if it is reasonable
in light of the language, policies and legislative history of the
statute.” Enercon,
151 F.3d at 1381.
The
Commission is a creature of statute.
Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645
F.2d 976, 987 (CCPA 1981).
Thus, it must find authority for its actions in its enabling
statute. See Young
Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d
1305, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“5 C.F.R. § 211.57 cannot, and
does not, provide greater authority than the statute.”). The Commission cites 19 U.S.C.
§ 1335, which gives the Commission authority to “adopt such
reasonable procedures and rules and regulations as it deems necessary to
carry out its functions and duties.” However, this provision does nothing
more than provide the Commission with authority to promulgate rules. It does not give the Commission the
substantive right to go beyond the express powers provided in
§ 1337. Similarly,
the Commission cites Rule 210.75(b), under which the enforcement proceeding
was conducted. However, the
Rule itself cannot provide the needed statutory authority. See Young Eng’rs,
721 F.2d at 1312. The Commission
also cites § 1337(f); however, that section concerns only cease
and desist orders and cannot provide the authority for Rule 210.75(b), at
least to the extent that the rule relates to the enforcement of a general
exclusion order. As VastFame
points out, a cease and desist order was not issued against it in this
case.
The
Commission also cites § 1337(k)(1), which provides that exclusion
orders shall remain in effect until the Commission determines otherwise;
and § 1337(k)(2), which provides that a party previously found in
violation of § 1337 may petition for a change of an exclusion
order. Section 1337(k)(1) says
nothing about the Commission’s authority to conduct enforcement
proceedings. Moreover, it was
Fuji, not the Commission, that initiated the present proceedings when it
filed its complaint. Section
1337(k)(2) is inapplicable because VastFame had not “previously been
found by the Commission to be in violation of” § 1337. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(k)(2)
(2000). And that would be true
even if VastFame had requested the proceedings. Finally, the Commission cites
§ 1337(i), which provides that the Commission may order the
seizure of goods previously adjudged to be in violation of § 1337
and previously denied entry.
But the Commission does not argue that any of these statutory
provisions, including § 1337(i), expressly authorizes the
enforcement proceeding conducted in this case. The Commission uses
§ 1337(i) to buttress its argument made with respect to each of
these statutory provisions that the authority to promulgate Rule 210.75(b)
emanates from the penumbra of § 1337. We cannot agree with the Commission
that, if no specific statutory authority exists, the Commission has the
inherent authority to conduct enforcement proceedings. Such a view is not reasonable in
light of the express powers provided in § 1337 and the fact that
the Commission is a creature of statute. Sealed Air Corp., 645 F.2d at
987. Because the
Commission’s proffered interpretation of the statute is unreasonable,
we reject it.
While no
statutory provision of § 1337 expressly refers to enforcement
proceedings, § 1337(b) gives the Commission general authority to
investigate violations of the statute.
Section 1337(b)(1) provides, “The Commission shall investigate
any alleged violation of this section on complaint under oath or upon its
initiative.” Section
1337(b), by its language, is not limited to initial complaints and
authorizes the Commission to conduct proceedings, including proceedings for
the enforcement of general exclusion orders, to “investigate any
alleged violation of this section on complaint under oath.” In this case, the Commission began
its investigation as a result of Fuji’s complaint. Initial Determination, slip
op. at 1. The statute further
provides that “the Commission shall publish notice thereof in the
Federal Register.” 19
U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (2000).
Consistent with this requirement, the Commission, in this case,
published notice of its investigation in the Federal Register. In re Certain Lens-Fitted Film
Packages, 66 Fed. Reg. 40,721 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 3,
2001) (notice of investigation).
Although
the Commission seeks to avoid basing its enforcement proceeding on
§ 1337(b), we hold that the Commission has authority to conduct
proceedings to enforce general exclusion orders, and that its authority to
conduct such proceedings arises under and is subject to the provisions of
§ 1337(b).
C. “All
Cases”
Having
determined that the Commission’s authority to conduct an enforcement
proceeding is found generally in § 1337(b), we next consider
whether the Commission violated § 1337 in not allowing VastFame
to present its invalidity defense.
The language of § 1337(b)(1) states: “The Commission shall investigate
any alleged violation of this section on complaint under oath or upon its
initiative.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). Investigations are governed
by § 1337(c), which states:
The
Commission shall determine, with respect to each investigation conducted by
it under this section, whether or not there is a violation of this
section . . . . Each determination under
subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall be made on the record after
notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with the provisions of
subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5.
All legal and equitable defenses may be presented in all
cases.
Id. § 1337(c) (emphases added).
On its
face, the statute appears to require the Commission to allow the
presentation of all defenses in its investigations. The Commission contends, however,
that the nature of a general exclusion order and the considerable burden in
establishing the need for such an order support the Commission’s view
that general exclusion orders may not be collaterally attacked. The Commission argues that
§ 1337(d)(2) is a codification of the Commission’s
balancing of the burden on domestic patentees of repeated litigation and
the effects on legitimate foreign trade of erroneous determinations as laid
down in Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components Thereof,
USITC Pub. No. 1199, Inv. No. 337-TA-90 (Nov. 1981). Section 1337(d)(2), however, only
addresses the criteria for issuance of general exclusion orders. It does not address whether general
exclusion orders may be subject to collateral attack. Section 1337(d)(2), then, provides
no support for the Commission’s position. Moreover, Congress’s intent in
adding § 1337(d)(2) was to comply with its obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, not to adopt the Commission’s
policy objectives as announced in Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps. See S. Rep. No. 103-412, at
120 (1994); H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, at 140-42 (1994) (“The amendments
are necessary to ensure that U.S. procedures for dealing with alleged
infringements by imported products comport with GATT 1994 ‘national
treatment’ rules, while providing for the effective enforcement of
intellectual property rights at the border.”).
The
Commission argues that general exclusion orders are like district court
injunctions in that they must be obeyed until they are modified, reversed,
or vacated. Thus, in the
Commission’s view, a general exclusion order, like a district court
injunction, should not be subject to collateral attack. However, a general exclusion order
is not like a district court injunction with respect to the parties
affected. A general exclusion
order broadly prohibits entry of articles that infringe the relevant claims
of a listed patent without regard to whether the persons importing such
articles were parties to, or were related to parties to, the investigation
that led to issuance of the general exclusion order. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(d)(2) (2000) (“The authority of the Commission to
order an exclusion from entry of articles shall be limited to persons
determined by the Commission to be violating this section unless the
Commission determines that . . . .”); Hyundai
Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d
1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that “in an appropriate case the
Commission can impose a general exclusion order that binds parties and
nonparties alike and effectively shifts to would-be importers of
potentially infringing articles, as a condition of entry, the burden of
establishing noninfringement”).
By contrast, district court injunctions are generally limited to the
parties entering appearances before the court or those aiding and abetting
or acting in concert or participation with a party before the court. Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Courts do not write
legislation for members of the public at large; they frame decrees and
judgments binding on the parties before them.”).
Because of the differing nature of general exclusion orders and
district court injunctions, the justification for the prohibition against
collateral challenges to injunctions is not directly applicable to general
exclusion orders. Thus, the
Commission’s analogy to district court injunctions is inapposite and
unhelpful.
Additionally,
the Commission cites Multi-Level Touch Control Lighting Switches,
Inv. No. 337-TA-225 (Int’l Trade Comm’n July 16, 1987), as
evidence of its long standing policy of not hearing challenges to the
validity of a patent underlying a general exclusion order in enforcement or
advisory proceedings. It sets
forth three public policy arguments to support this position: (1) the difficulty in administering
the statute if general exclusion orders are subject to repeated challenges;
(2) the necessity of preserving the original complainant’s remedy
once it has been issued; and (3) the public interest in avoiding
uncertainty in the market place.
One can argue that all of these policies would be similarly served
by preventing subsequent accused infringers in district courts from
challenging the validity of a patent that had been previously adjudicated
to be not invalid. However,
that is not the law. These
policies do not justify the Commission’s interpretation in the
absence of a showing that the statute may be fairly read the way the
Commission interprets it. To
the contrary, the intent of Congress with respect to this issue is quite
clear.
Nevertheless,
the Commission argues that the “all cases” language of
§ 1337(c) only applies to original investigations, not advisory
and enforcement proceedings.
The Commission argues that the following language of
§ 1337(c) indicates that the statute only provides for
presentation of all defenses in proceedings that lead to determinations
under § 1337(d) or (e):
The Commission shall determine, with respect to
each investigation conducted by it under this section, whether or not there
is a violation of this section . . . . Each
determination under subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall be made on
the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with
the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5. All legal and equitable defenses may
be presented in all cases.
19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(c) (2000).
Because subsections (d) and (e) both relate to the issuance of
exclusion orders, the Commission’s interpretation would require the
Commission to first determine whether a complainant was likely to prevail
before deciding whether all defenses may be presented. Moreover, the second sentence quoted
above specifically refers to determinations “under subsection (d) or
(e),” whereas the “all defenses” rule applies to
“all cases.” If
Congress had intended the “all defenses” provision to only
apply to proceedings that lead to determinations under subsections (d) and
(e), or even to original proceedings, it could have easily said so. The Commission’s proffered
interpretation contravenes the clear language of the statute.
VastFame
is correct that the “all defenses” provision at least applies
to investigations under § 1337(b). The opening sentence of
§ 1337(c) plainly indicates that investigations under
§ 1337(b) are governed by § 1337(c). No other language in
§ 1337(c) modifies the broad reference to “all cases.” Thus, we hold that the phrase
“all cases” clearly encompasses investigations under
§ 1337(b). The
necessary result, then, is that participants in a proceeding under
§ 1337(b) must be permitted to raise all defenses.
The
Commission argues that an interpretation of § 1337(c) that makes
every Commission proceeding subject to the “all defenses” rule
is inconsistent with § 1337(i). Section 1337(i) provides authority
for the Commission to issue an order requiring articles imported in
violation of § 1337 to be seized and forfeited to the United
States if the article was previously the subject of an attempted
importation that was denied by reason of an order issued under subsection
(d) and upon such denial the party seeking to import was informed of the
exclusion order and that any further attempts to import such articles would
result in seizure and forfeiture.
The Commission’s argument misses the mark, however, because
VastFame has not asked us to hold that the “all defenses”
provision applies to all proceedings in the Commission. VastFame argues that the “all
defenses” provision applies to § 1337(b) at a minimum. Thus, whether the “all
defenses” provision applies to § 1337(i) is not before
us. We hold only that the
phrase “all cases” encompasses investigations under
§ 1337(b). We need
not and do not decide what other proceedings may fall within the scope of
“all cases.”
D. Due
Process
Because
we hold that the Commission erred by not allowing VastFame to present its
invalidity defense based on the clear language of § 1337(c), we
do not reach the issue of whether VastFame’s due process rights were
violated in this case.
E. VastFame’s
Invalidity Defense
As an
alternative argument, VastFame asks this court not merely to vacate but to
reverse the Commission’s final determination if we find, without
further need of evidence, that claim 15 of the ’087 patent is
invalid. The Commission
declined to entertain VastFame’s invalidity defense; it has not ruled
on the merits of this defense.
In Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir.
1984), this court held that it “does not sit to review what the
Commission has not decided.”
Accordingly, the court will not consider the merits of the validity
defense that was neither heard nor decided by the Commission. Instead, having determined that the
Commission erred in excluding the validity challenge, we remand the case to
the Commission for consideration of VastFame’s invalidity defense in
the first instance.
CONCLUSION
Because
the Commission’s decision precluding VastFame from raising its
invalidity defense was not reasonable or supported by the language,
policies, and legislative history of § 1337, we vacate the
Commission’s enforcement decision and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
COSTS
No costs.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
02-1222, -1291
ALLOC, INC.,
BERRY FINANCE N.V., and VALINGE ALUMINIUM, AB,
Appellants,
v.
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION,
Appellee,
and
PERGO, INC.,
and
ROYSOL,
and
AKZENTA PANEELE +
PROFILE GmbH,
and
UNILIN DÉCOR N.V., BHK OF AMERICA, and
MEISTER-LEISTEN SCHULTE, GmbH,
Intervenors.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge
RADER. Dissenting opinion filed
by Circuit Judge SCHALL.
RADER, Circuit Judge.
In its Final Determination on Investigation No.
337-TA-443 under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (section 337), the United
States International Trade Commission (Commission) found no infringement of
patent claims covering flooring products and methods of joining flooring
products. In the Matter of
Certain Flooring Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-443, Notice of Final Initial
Determination (Nov. 2, 2001) (Initial Determination); In the Matter of
Certain Flooring Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-443, Notice of Final
Determination (Mar. 22, 2002) (Final Determination). Absent patent infringement,
the Commission found no domestic injury under section 337 by the imported
flooring products. Because the
domestic producers, Alloc, Inc., Berry Finance N.V., and Valinge Aluminum
AB (collectively, Alloc), cannot prove infringement of the properly
construed claims, this court affirms.
I.
Alloc filed a complaint with the Commission alleging
the importation and sale of the accused flooring materials violated section
337. To show a violation of
section 337(a)(1)(B) or section 337(a)(2), a complainant can prove three
elements: (1) the importation
of goods into the United States or sales of imported goods within the
United States; (2) infringement by those goods or sales of a valid and
enforceable United States patent; and (3) an industry in the United States
marketing the patented articles.
19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a)(1)(B) & 1337(a)(2)
(2000).
Alloc owns the rights to U.S. Patent Nos. 5,860,267
(the ’267 patent),
6,023,907 (the ’907 patent), and 6,182,410 (the ’410 patent),
which claim systems and methods of joining floor panels. Alloc alleged violation of section
337 by reason of infringement of these patents’ claims. The asserted patents share the
identical specification and all claim priority from the same Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application, filed April 29, 1994, and a
continuation of this PCT application, U.S. Application No. 08/436,224,
filed May 17, 1995, now issued U.S. Patent No. 5,706,621.
Alloc asserted that Intervenors Pergo, Inc. (Pergo),
Roysol, Akzenta Paneele + Profile, GmbH (Akzenta), Unilin N.V. (Unilin),
and Meister-Leisten Schulte, GmbH (Meister)
all imported flooring products that infringe claims in the ’267,
’907, and ’410 patents. With the exception of Roysol, the
Intervenors admitted importation of the accused flooring products, but
denied infringing the asserted patents. By order dated July 10, 2001, the
administrative judge made an initial determination, which found that Alloc
had shown the existence of a domestic industry marketing the patented
products – the third requirement under section 337. The administrative judge convened an
evidentiary hearing on patent infringement.
Claim 19 of the ’267 patent, claim 1 of the
’907 patent, and claim 1 of the ’410 patent are representative
of the asserted claims from each patent and state (emphases added):
Claim 19 of the ’267 patent
A method for laying and
mechanically joining rectangular building panels in parallel rows, the
method comprising the steps of:
a) placing
a new one of the panels adjacent to a long edge of a previously laid first
one of the panels in a first row and to a short edge of a previously laid
second one of the panels in an adjacent second row, such that the new one
of the panels is in the second row, while holding the new one of the panels
at an angle relative to a principal plane of the first panel, such that the
new one of the panels is spaced from its final longitudinal position
relative to said second panel and such that a long edge of the new panel is
provided with a locking groove which is placed upon and in contact with a
locking strip at the adjacent long edge of the first panel;
b) subsequently
angling down the new one of the panels so as to accommodate a locking
element of the strip of the first panel in the locking groove of the
new panel, whereby the new panel and the first panel are mechanically
connected with each other in a second direction with respect to the thus
connected long edges, wherein the long edges, in the angled down position
of the new panel, are in engagement with each other and thereby
mechanically locked together in a first direction also; and
c) displacing
the new one of the panels in its longitudinal direction relative to the
first panel towards a final longitudinal position until a locking
element of one of the short edges of the new one of the panels and the
second panel snaps up into a locking groove of the other one of the short
edges, whereby the new one of the panels and the second panel are
mechanically connected with each other in both in the first direction and
in the second direction with respect to the thus connected short edges.
Claim 1 of the ’907 patent
A method of laying and
mechanically joining floor panels in parallel rows, wherein relative
positions of the panels during the method can be defined as including first
and second mutual positions, a first mutual position in which (i) the two
panels are held in an angled position relative to each other and (ii) upper
portions of adjacent edges of the two panels are in mutual contact, and a
second mutual position in which the two panels are (i) located in a common
plane, (ii) mechanically locked to each other in a first direction that is
at right angles to the common plane, (iii) mechanically locked to each other
in a second direction, that is at right angles to said first direction and
to the adjacent joint edges, as
a result of a first locking member disposed at one of the adjacent
edges being connected to a second locking member disposed at the
other one of the adjacent edges, and (iv) being displaceable in relation
to each other in the direction of the adjacent joint edges, wherein
said method comprises the steps of:
a) bringing
a new one of the panels into an intermediary position where (i) a
previously laid first one of the panels is located in a first row, (ii) a
second one of the panels is located in a second row and is in said first
mutual position in relation to the first panel, and (iii) the new panel is
located in the second row and is in said second mutual position in relation
to the second panel and is in a position relative to the first panel such
that a mutual distance is present between the upper portions of the
adjacent joint edges of the new panel and the first panel;
b) while
maintaining said second mutual position between the new panel and the
second panel, displacing the new panel relative to the second panel into
said first mutual position in relation to the first panel; and
c) angling
the new panel and the second panel together into said second mutual
position in relation to the first panel.
Claim 1 of the ’410
patent
An edge lock for use in a flooring system having a plurality of
floor panels, the edge lock for mechanically and releasably locking
together adjacent edges of pairs of adjacent floor panels during assembly
of the flooring system and when said adjacent floor panels are laying flat
on a subfloor with upper corner portions of said adjacent edges being
mutually spaced apart, said edge lock comprising:
locking means for forming
a first mechanical connection for locking said adjacent edges to each other
in a vertical direction, and for forming a second mechanical connection for
locking said adjacent edges to
each other in a horizontal direction at right angles to said edges, said
locking means including:
(i)
a locking groove extending parallel to and spaced
from a first one of the adjacent edges of one of the adjacent floor panels
and being open at a rear side of said one adjacent floor panel, and
(ii)
a flexible and resilient locking strip integrated
with another of the adjacent floor panels, said locking strip extending
throughout substantially an entire length of an edge of the another
adjacent floor panel, said locking strip being provided with a locking
element projecting from the locking strip,
said locking
means being constructed so as to operate as a one-way
snap lock in said
horizontal direction during the assembly of said flooring system when
displacing said adjacent edges towards each other by resiliently urging the
flexible locking strip downwards until the upper portions of said adjacent
edges have been brought into complete engagement with each other and the
locking element thereby snaps into the locking groove to prevent drifting
apart of said adjacent edges, and
said locking means also
being constructed so as to enable said
adjacent panels, while they
are mechanically connected to each other by said first and second
mechanical connections, to be turned in relation to each other about
said upper corner portions of their locked-together edges in an angular
direction so as to move the locking element out of the locking groove in
order to unlock said one-way snap lock.
After considering the specification, prosecution
history, and other relevant evidence, the administrative judge construed
the claims to require “play” or a space between a locking
groove on a first panel and the locking element of a panel adjacent to the
first panel. The administrative
judge construed the claim terms “locking means,” “locking
element,” and “locking member” in view of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶ 6 to have structures requiring play. The administrative judge also
construed the claims independently of § 112, ¶ 6 and
arrived at essentially the same claim construction. In view of this construction, the administrative
judge found no literal infringement by the imported products because he
found that their locking systems did not include play. Without infringement, the
administrative judge found that Alloc did not meet the domestic injury
requirement of section 337.
Therefore, the administrative judge absolved the intervenors of any
violation of section 337 on November 2, 2001.
II.
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